CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM:

SUBSYSTEM:

ASI

Electrical Cable Trays

FUNCTIONAL CRIT: PHASE(S):

1 b

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE: J, 12-19-97

HAZARD REF:

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ANALYSTS:

J. Hicks/E. Howell

FAILURE MODE:

Structural Failure

FAILURE EFFECT:

Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to LH2 tank structural failure or debris source

to Orbiter from cover.

TIME TO EFFECT:

immediate

FAILURE CAUSE(S):

A: Improper Manufacture

B: Failure of Attaching Hardware

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Provide environmental protection for lines and cables routed along the LH2 tank surface.

FMEA ITEM CODE(S)	PART NO.	PART NAME	OTY	EFFECTIVITY
4.3.22.1	80911041418-010	Cover, Cable Tray (LH2)	1	LWT-54 & Up
4.3.23.1	80911041418-019	Cover, Cable Tray (LH2)	1	LWT-54 & Up
4.3.24.1	80911041418-020 -020	Cover, Cable Tray (LH2)	7 10	LWT-54 thru 59 LWT-60 & Up
4.3.25.1	80911041418-039	Cover, Cable Tray (LH2)	2	LWT-54 & Up
4.3.26.1	80911041418-040	Cover, Cable Tray (LHZ)	1	LLT-54 & Up

REMARKS: The cable tray covers are grouped as the failure mode, causes and effects are the same.

4.3-13

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM:

ASI

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE:

J, 12-19-97

SUBSYSTEM: FMEA ITEM CODE(S): Electrical Cable Trays

4.3.22.1, 4.3.23.1, 4.3.24.1, 4.3.25.1,

4.3.26.1

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

- The cable tray covers are machined from 2024-781 aluminum alloy sheet stock. Materials selected for this A, B: part number are in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 which assures repetitive conformance of composition and properties.
- The cable tray covers are designed to the required yield (1.1) and ultimate (1.4) safety factors (ET Stress Report 826-2188). A:
- The attaching hardware is selected from the Approved Standard Parts Lists (ASPL 826-3500). The hardware is installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on Engineering drawings. Tensile installation loads are sufficient to provide screening for major flaws in individual fasteners. в:

TEST:

The Cover, Cable Tray (LH2) is certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S019 (LWT-54 thru 88) and HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S514 (LWT-89 & Up).

Vendor:

R: Attaching fasteners are procured and tested to standard drawings 26L17 and 34L1.

INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection-Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

- Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, drawing 80911041418 and standard A, B: drawings 26L17 and 34L1).
- A: Inspect dimensional conformance (drawing 80911041418).

MAF Quality Inspection:

- Inspect that attaching hardware is free from damage (drawing 80911041429 and STP2014). в:
- Verify installation and witness torque (drawing 80911041429). A, B:
- Verify Locking feature (drawing 80911041429 and STP2014). В:

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.